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Abstract: Private equity represents a ‘new actor’ in the British business system 
with the capacity to have a significant impact on industrial relations. However, 
while private equity and its associated business model appear as significant 
factors in corporate governance and industrial relations, neither the sector nor 
the business model has been evaluated theoretically or empirically. Indeed, for 
the UK at firm level the ways in which business strategy and job regulation are 
shaped by private equity are unclear other than by references made to institutional 
configuration in the business system – short-termism. This article outlines what 
private equity is, details its associated business model, describes how the sector 
affects workers and summarizes how trade unions have responded to the private 
equity business model.
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1 Introduction
The term ‘private equity’ refers broadly to any type of equity investment in 
an asset that is not freely tradable on a public stock market. These types of 
investment range from start-up and ‘seed’ capital supplied to entrepreneurs 
by venture capitalist investors to larger passive investors who put money into 
private equity funds that are in turn used by private equity fund partnerships to 
buy and ‘take private’ large mature businesses. Today, the majority of private 
equity investment falls into the ‘take private’ category. Currently 10 percent 
of the UK workforce is employed in private equity owned businesses and 19 
percent of the workforce is employed in firms that have at some stage been in 
private equity ownership (House of Commons Treasury Committee [HCTC], 
2007: 7). Outside the USA, the UK is the most developed market for private 
equity, accounting for 50 percent of all private equity investment in Europe 
in 2005 (British Venture Capital Association [BVCA], 2006: 5). In 2006, UK-
based fund managers raised £34bn and in the same year there were 304 deals 
based on the private equity business model (PEBM), 100 of which were val-
ued at less than £5m and 25 of which were valued at over £250m. In 2007, 
the Alliance Boots deal brokered by Kohlberg, Kravis and Roberts (KKR) was 
costed at £11bn, and was the UK’s largest ever deal. It was also the first PEBM 
buy-in to a FTSE 100 company (HCTC, 2007: 5).
The significance of private equity and the PEBM, particularly its ‘take pri-
vate’ variant, is that the institution and the model each have the potential to 
shape employer behaviour towards job regulation, both directly and indirectly. 
Accordingly this article addresses three questions. First, what are the implica-
tions of private equity and the PEBM for collective bargaining and trade unions 
in the British business system? Second, what are the direct firm level pressures 
on management and workers that flow from the diffusion of the PEBM. For 
example, a firm acquired by a private equity investor may be subject to signifi-
cant financial, commercial and organizational restructuring, each of which is 
likely to have an impact on industrial relations. The third question is what are 
the more indirect consequences of the PEBM on business more generally? 
The acquisition by private equity may have a significant direct effect on indus-
trial relations at firm level, but this may not always be the case. However, over 
time more widely across the British business system the indirect effects of the 
PEBM and associated strategies, such as hostility to ‘inherited’ collective bar-
gaining and ‘union busting’, may appear as best practice innovations beyond 
private equity backed firms.
The remainder of the article divides into four sections; Section 2 outlines 
the nature of private equity, and provides a detailed evaluation of the PEBM. 
Section 3 summarizes the research methods and sources that were drawn on to 
develop the argument in the article. Section 4 describes how the PEBM affects 
employees, while Section 5 summarizes how trade unions have responded to 
private equity and the PEBM.
Clark: Private Equity in the UK
491
2 Private Equity and the Private Equity Business Model
Defining Private Equity
In the main institutional investors in Britain invest in publicly-quoted firms 
on London’s stock exchange in two ways: one via equity markets, and two 
via investment in debt-based funds in the form of debentures. The latter give 
debt holders creditor status over company assets in the event of default or 
bankruptcy. Recently there has been significant growth in capital flowing into 
private equity funds. This growth has been so extensive that the private equity 
sector within Britain’s capital market now provides a specific business model 
designed to support start-up and established businesses. It involves innova-
tive commercial and operational strategies centred on sophisticated financial 
management and debt leverage that aim to enhance company efficiency. The 
rationale for the model is firmly located in agency approaches to the theory of 
the firm and corporate governance, and hence gives priority to shareholder 
rather than stakeholder interests in governance.
Private equity fund management partnerships are one part of a highly 
stratified fund management and venture capital sector that comprises three 
components. First, there is a large group of small entrepreneurial firms that 
focus on smaller domestic transactions. These providers are often termed ven-
ture capitalists and look to support promising business ventures in search of 
start-up and ‘roll-out’ capital. A second group of larger firms tends to focus on 
domestic transactions in the form of management buy-outs of, or in some cases 
management buy-ins to, established but predominantly mid-market British-
based businesses. A third group comprises fewer but much larger multinational 
funds that undertake very large domestic and international transactions on the 
private equity business model. The contemporary activity of firms and their 
fund managers in the second and third segment of the sector extends beyond 
private firms, with many firms becoming renowned for ‘take private’ deals of 
publicly-listed companies or parts of them. In these deals, private equity firms 
(using a combination of equity and debt) may act by themselves or, in a consor-
tium of banks, individuals or sovereign wealth funds, buy-out all the publicly 
quoted shares in a company thereby taking the company private. Operationally, 
private equity firms establish and operate collective investment schemes and 
advise on, assess and manage investment deals for clients (Financial Services 
Authority [FSA], 2006: 79). These groups are predominantly funded by institu-
tional investors such as pension funds, commercial and retail banks, insurance 
companies, government agencies and local authorities (see Clark, 2007).
To summarize, many private equity firms are unlisted limited partnerships 
made up of general partners (the fund managers) and limited partners (the inves-
tors) who provide the bulk of the investment capital for the fund. The PEBM 
rests on the sophisticated use of financial engineering to transform ‘cheap’ or 
‘under-performing’ businesses. Hitherto public companies owned by private 
equity partnerships are freed from the burden of quarterly reports and associ-
ated transparency. As a result private equity firms can manage businesses run 
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on the PEBM to emphasize governance principles based on direct ownership 
and agency rather than on a separation of ownership and control.
Agency and the PEBM
Advocates of the PEBM reject the utility of managerial theories of the firm that 
emphasize managerial discretion and shareholder deference to professional sal-
aried managers (Berle and Means, 1932; Chandler, 1977; Marris, 1964; Means, 
1930; Williamson, 1964, 1967). Instead the model draws on agency theory 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and focuses not on institutionally-embedded 
patterns of efficiency and organizational capability in national variants of man-
agerial capitalism (America and the UK in particular) but on the waste and 
inefficiency of managerial discretion for shareholders. Thus, within the PEBM 
there is a contractual approach to management and investment returns that in 
effect takes the form of a partnership agreement between fund managers and 
professional institutional investors.
Agency relationships exist when one or more persons – the principals – engage 
other individuals – the agents – to perform a service on their behalf. This will 
necessarily involve some delegation of decision-making authority to the agent. 
In managerial theories of the firm this is referred to as managerial discretion. 
Theoretically, the cost of managerial discretion to the owners of a business 
and/or the investors in a business is a residual loss. Historically, residual losses 
arising from managerial discretion were acceptable during the post-war eco-
nomic boom as industrial concentration in the American and British business 
system facilitated technical innovation that, in turn, secured reduced unit costs 
and sustained profit levels (see O’Sullivan, 2000: 105–46). However, this can 
only be regarded as successful because the discretionary base of management 
provided them with countervailing power relative to trade unions, consum-
er organizations and government regulation (Galbraith, 1952, 1967). In the 
contemporary period, the PEBM is specifically geared towards minimizing 
residual losses in an altogether different way to the manner suggested by those 
managerial theories which accept the losses associated with the separation of 
ownership and control. Thus, the key difference between national variants of 
managerial capitalism and the PEBM is a distributional one and in the legiti-
macy accorded to countervailing interests. To a degree, post-war managerial 
capitalism was inclusive of these countervailing power interests whereas in the 
contemporary period deregulation has created an environment where social 
exclusion of consumer and worker interests is acceptable and encouraged.
Agency theory predicts that owners and investors such as private equity 
fund managers can limit both managerial opportunism and the countervailing 
interests of non-shareholder stakeholders through a combination of incentives 
and monitoring mechanisms. Research has found that it is often the case that 
private equity fund managers incentivize managers to perform like owners by 
linking remuneration to firm performance. Senior management can be incen-
tivized to do so by equity options linked to future performance and direct share 
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ownership, sometimes gifted to them in the form of ‘sweet equity’. Evidence 
gathered on private equity engagement with acquisitions in the UK suggests 
that performance management is a private equity investor concern in 79 
percent of cases, with executive stock options and incentives utilized in 32 per-
cent of cases to incentivize management to deliver on contractual conditions 
(Martin et al., 2007: 84–8). In addition to this, agency approaches to manage-
ment are evident in performance monitoring imposed on middle management 
and worker teams. In the majority of case studies of private equity buyout 
companies, shorter-term performance metrics and performance targets were 
introduced as a direct result of private equity ownership and control. This is 
reminiscent of Alchian and Demsetz’s (1972) description of the managerial 
problem of ‘shirking’ in team production and Edwards’ (1979) description of 
technical and bureaucratic control over management and workers. So, in the-
ory, private equity is an agency model that minimizes the disjunction between 
investors and owners and employees, whether senior management or workers, 
by a combination of incentives and self-imposed monitoring that reduce the 
residual losses incurred by management discretion, which are seen as accept-
able within alternative managerial approaches to the firm.
Private Equity Fund Managers are Not Magicians but They Very Nearly Are
The PEBM operates in a highly leveraged manner. The debt component as a 
percentage of an acquisition is often very high – up to 70 percent in many cases 
and much higher in some others. For example, KKR invested less than £1bn of 
its own money in the £11bn acquisition of Alliance Boots. The effects of high 
leverage are evident in two ways. The first is related to exit. Fund managers 
aim to sell-on acquisitions within a five year time frame often via a new pub-
lic offering of shares, thereby returning a business to the listed market. This 
enables private equity partners to repay their debt to investors, secure their tax 
breaks, and pass on the firm’s debt. For example, debts that result from sale and 
leaseback of property portfolios or an underfunded pension scheme remain 
on the balance sheet of the acquired firm (not the private equity investor) and 
are therefore easily passed to a new firm. Second, the effects of high lever-
age are observed in cost reductions and divestments or out-sourcing to reduce 
debt. For example, HR might be outsourced on a shared business model. In 
terms of employment relations, extra value may be extracted by ‘harder’ HRM 
and adoption of ‘low road’ strategies for workplace agreements on substantive 
and procedural terms and conditions of employment (HCTC, 2007: 11–17, 
30–6).
3 Methods and Sources
The researcher initially came across the term ‘private equity’ in fieldwork exam-
ining HRM in US multinationals (Clark and Almond, 2004).1 These references 
were subsequently followed up and further developed in work commissioned 
by the Financial Services Authority and the Treasury Select Committee for its 
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examination of private equity (Clark, 2007; FSA, 2006; HCTC, 2007). The 
commissioned work examined the extent to which acquisition, ownership or 
control by private equity results in patterns of management and job regulation, 
which are characteristic of the private equity stereotype, particularly its ‘take 
private’ variant. The findings presented in Section 4 draw on qualitative semi-
structured case study interviews with interview respondents from the BVCA, 
the FSA, two of the largest private equity funds based in the UK specializing 
in ‘take private’ deals, legal officers, regional convenors and general secretar-
ies of the GMB and UNITE trade unions, lay trade union representatives and 
workers, and customers of firms that are owned or controlled by private equity. 
Twenty formal face-to-face interviews were conducted. Apart from the cus-
tomer interviewees, each of the respondents had extensive involvement and 
experience in several high profile cases of private equity-backed buy-outs and 
subsequent employment relations restructuring. In addition to this primary 
material, secondary source material is drawn from sources as diverse as the 
BVCA, the International Trade Union Confederation, regulatory authorities 
such the FSA, government departments, and private equity partnerships them-
selves.
4 What Does Private Equity Do to Workers?
Although first developed in the American business system in the early 1980s 
the PEBM is a ‘stateless development’. Firms subject to the model are subor-
dinated to the competitive logic of global capital markets rather than the real 
economy for goods and services in the national business systems in which they 
are located. At firm level the direct effects of the PEBM on workers can be 
immediate: a GMB union campaign argues that in firms acquired by private 
equity, employees are likely to experience job cuts, work intensification and, 
in some cases, a regime of workplace ‘bullying’ in order to accommodate and 
accept the management of change (see http://www.GMB.org.uk).
Change Management, Asset Stripping and Liability Dumping
At the Bird’s Eye Hull plant private equity owners closed the plant after five 
months of operation without any notice and transferred 600 jobs to Germany. 
At the Automobile Association (AA), private equity owners de-recognized the 
trade union, ended check-off arrangements, and offered to pay staff subscrip-
tions to a new ‘scab’ ‘staff association’ led by a former GMB official. They 
subsequently offered redundant staff an £18,000 ‘take it or leave it’ offer that 
was reduced to £12,000 in the second round of redundancies. Under the terms 
of the de-recognized collective bargaining agreement, longer serving employ-
ees could have received redundancy payments of up to £50,000. In total the AA 
made over 3500 workers redundant (35 percent of the workforce) resulting in 
fewer patrol staff, a less comprehensive out-of-hours service and reduced cycle 
times for patrol staff to diagnose breakdowns. In effect, the latter has resulted 
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in many AA members experiencing a ‘tow not fix’ service as patrol staff have 
only 15 minutes per breakdown (if patrol staff think a repair or re-start will take 
more than 15 minutes the vehicle will be towed to a garage) (interview notes 
and TSC/GMB, 2007).2 NCP car parking has passed through the hands of 
three private equity owners in under two years with successive sales extracting 
over £800m in profits for the funds. The current owners of NCP car parking 
have sought to de-recognize the trade union and remove annual staff bonuses.
Not all of the respondents reported ‘lower road’ restructuring. The mate-
rial collected shows a range of management approaches in firms controlled 
by private equity, not just the more familiar negative ownership cases often 
referred to in the media. While the evidence cited by the GMB in respect of the 
AA, Bird’s Eye and NCP is a matter of public record, the private equity sector 
consistently refuses to respond in public. Requests for access to portfolio com-
panies or private equity funds are consistently declined. Hence while unions 
are right to campaign against private equity and the PEBM, the typicality of 
cases such as the AA, Bird’s Eye, NCP car parks and several others cannot be 
objectively evaluated. There is some academic evidence that reports a positive 
effect of private equity and venture capital ownership on employment levels 
(see Bacon et al., 2004; Wright et al., this issue).
Significantly but less well publicized, workers in private equity-owned firms 
have seen their pension schemes wound up because there are insufficient funds 
to meet liabilities. In addition, in some cases the sponsoring employer or its 
subsidiary has been declared insolvent. Of course, wind-up and insolvency is 
not restricted to businesses owned by private equity. However, union critics 
of private equity acquisition argue that pension scheme funds are either used 
to help collateralize an acquisition or existing deficits are deepened as private 
equity owners take pension holidays and fund deficits with loans. Currently 
there are 59 PEBM backed schemes in the Financial Assistance Scheme (which 
is funded and underwritten by the taxpayer) (GMB Union, 2007: 10).
If there is some debate in respect of the effects of private equity ownership 
on workers, other less direct effects associated with the PEBM are undeniable. 
Workers lose out indirectly as taxpayers; for instance it is the latter who fund 
the financial assistance scheme. The Exchequer loses out due to the tax breaks 
afforded to the PEBM that allow for the interest on the debt incurred to acquire 
a firm to be partly written off against tax. For example, KKR’s acquisition of 
Alliance Boots will cost the Exchequer around £150m in lost corporation tax. 
An associated danger here is that the PEBM could become a ‘best practice’ 
template for more responsible non-private equity firms who see themselves 
at a competitive disadvantage in terms of tax payments and hence revenues 
available to satisfy shareholder value. Early non-private equity adopters of the 
PEBM include British Airways (BA), which is part of a private equity con-
sortium aiming to acquire Iberia (the Spanish national airline), and Tata, the 
Indian conglomerate which financed its acquisition of Corus using the PEBM, 
a practice it then repeated in the acquisition of Jaguar and Land Rover.
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5 How Have Trade Unions Responded to the PEBM in 
the UK?
Despite the significant presence of the PEBM in the British business system 
and growing media and regulatory concern, academic attention is less exten-
sive in the industrial relations literature than in the financial economics and 
political economy literatures. This is the case despite considerable trade union 
comment and concern about the effects of the PEBM on industrial relations 
and human resource management at firm level post-buy-out. Indeed such is 
the momentum of the GMB trade union campaign to defend collective bar-
gaining, that it is credited in political circles with embarrassing the Treasury 
into establishing a Select Committee on private equity.
The GMB and UNITE union each campaigned to publicize the effects to 
members of private equity acquisition of companies. The GMB campaign 
in particular was more sophisticated than just calls for industrial action. It 
involved numerous publicity stunts designed to raise media and political atten-
tion. Some of the stunts targeted well-known but publicity shy private equity 
fund managers who had refused to have anything to do with unions, arguing 
that the businesses they controlled had made voluntary and lawful decisions 
to de-recognize collective bargaining agreements. As these stunts gave way 
to well-organized newsprint, radio and TV campaigns, unions began to focus 
on the transparency and taxation implications of the PEBM in order to attack 
the distributional consequences of the model. In early 2007, parts of the finan-
cial press, the Financial Times in particular, and some members of the private 
equity sector, such as Jon Moulton of Alchemy partners and Labour supporter 
Ronald Cohen of Apex partners, suggested that regulation of the sector was 
inevitable. This culminated in the Treasury Select Committee examination of 
the private equity sector and an attempt at self-regulation in the form of a code 
of conduct for the sector (Walker Report, 2007). Following on from initial 
publicity campaigns, union responses to the FSA, the Treasury select commit-
tee, and the Walker review code of conduct became more sophisticated and 
well organized. These union responses emphasized four substantive industrial 
relations issues.
Taxation
Unions have argued that a clear distinction between taxation of companies and 
taxation of individuals and their personal income is necessary. For example, 
private equity fund managers, managers in acquired firms, and employees with 
share options are all currently able to declare their profits on share ownership 
and share options as a capital gain not earned income. The tax breaks were not 
designed to help huge private equity ‘take private’ deals such as those associ-
ated with Alliance Boots or EMI, but were aimed at supporting small venture 
capital firms in entrepreneurial developments in need of seed corn and start-up 
cum roll-out funding. The union objection, and that of the Treasury Select 
Clark: Private Equity in the UK
497
Committee, is both distributional and equity-based. Fund managers and oper-
ational managers in acquired firms currently pay less taxation on their profits 
from share income than do workers in PAYE contributions. The situation has 
become less fair since April 2008 as the 10 percent band of taxation for lower 
paid workers was abolished at that time. So even if profit on share income is 
taxed at 18 percent this is still less than the base rate for income tax levied on 
the low paid.
Collective Bargaining Agreements and Transfer of Undertakings
The Transfer of Undertakings Protection of Employment (TUPE) regu-
lations as they currently stand do not cover transfer of business ownership 
through majority share sales, that is, where the firm remains intact but its con-
trolling owner changes. A change of this type is not treated as a change of 
ownership affecting industrial relations as far as the law is concerned. In effect 
this allows a new owner to de-recognize a trade union, disregard any collective 
bargaining agreement and restructure the firm and its pattern of job regulation 
in a manner that is not possible in more traditional merger and acquisitions. 
Unions have called for the TUPE 2006 regulations to be extended to cover 
acquisitions through majority share sales and have further called for European 
Union (EU)-wide consideration of the impact of the PEBM on: TUPE, the 
Acquired Rights Directive, the Information and Consultation Directive, 
and the Takeover Panel Secrecy Code. The latter issue is important because 
discussion of a potential PEBM acquisition with a recognized trade union and/
or disclosure of a business plan for such an acquisition would breach stock 
exchange rules and the takeover panel secrecy code. This point is used by some, 
the BVCA for example, to argue that TUPE can never be applicable in cases of 
acquisition by change of majority shareholder. The contrary view is that these 
difficulties demonstrate the need for the extension of TUPE provisions to all 
types of acquisition, including those of public sector workers transferred to the 
private sector through share acquisition. However, while this extension is easy 
to argue, it will be much more difficult to achieve in practice and this is a major 
challenge for the union movement and its academic and political supporters.
Disclosure and Transparency
Currently private equity firms do not have to disclose who their investors are, 
where they are domiciled, how they are paying for their stake in a fund, or how 
much they pay themselves, the management-turn-around teams, and consult-
ants they parachute into acquired firms. The GMB and the UNITE union have 
each campaigned for clearer disclosure rules on the payment of fees and charg-
es levied by private equity owners. The lack of disclosure and transparency is 
even more pronounced in respect of share buy backs and re-capitalizations. An 
acquired firm will fund a buy-back or a re-capitalization of its overall financial 
structure by taking on more debt; buy backs and re-capitalizations are usually 
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used to fund special dividend payments to equity owners, that is, fund man-
agers and other investors. What is peculiar to the PEBM is that this type of 
dividend payment comes from debt not profit, with the debt remaining on the 
balance sheet of the acquired firm. This practice is entirely lawful in the UK.
Pension Funds and Property Portfolios as Collateral
A unique feature of the PEBM is the use of assets in an acquired firm as col-
lateral for the purchase of the firm. A common feature of the PEBM is sale and 
leaseback of company assets. While the sale of assets yields significant cash 
flow, leased-back rents become an additional leakage from profits. Depending 
on the length of the lease they could become more burdensome in the future 
or lead to the loss of outlets as landlords dispose of leases in more attractive 
ways. Pension funds can be used in this way as collateral and, post acquisition, 
a pension fund can be transferred to a less solvent subsidiary. Both practices are 
lawful in the UK, as is the separation of pension schemes from sponsoring firms 
through the sale of schemes in the secondary private equity market. In effect, 
for a fee, providers manage pension schemes on a shared business model and 
make their margin out of securing economies of scope by administering several 
schemes. Thereafter, schemes may become frozen or insolvent if new owners 
take payment holidays to boost cash flow and profitability or if the original 
sponsoring business goes into liquidation. Although each of these practices 
is subject to the provisions of the Pensions Act 2004 they are all more or less 
unregulated, as all the regulator is required to judge in these cases (guided by 
pension scheme trustees) is whether on balance the company has deliberately 
dumped the scheme or whether they have undertaken a risky restructuring. 
Unions have called for each of these areas to be better regulated. For example, 
the GMB and UNITE argue that the pensions regulator should be required to 
consult with recognized unions as well as pension trustees. More significantly, 
unions have called for PEBM business plans to rank pension scheme obliga-
tions ahead of investor interests in the event of any insolvency. Currently this is 
not the case and if a pension scheme ends up in the financial assistance scheme 
or the pension protection plan, taxpayers, workers, and employers with prop-
erly-ordered schemes foot the bill.
6 Summary and Conclusions
The significance of the PEBM in the British business system is threefold. One, 
it represents a new organizational form and associated business model that can 
be conceptualized in terms of a strong agency approach to corporate govern-
ance. At a system level its competitive logic threatens to challenge established 
institutional interests that extend beyond those of investors and shareholders. 
Below this, at firm level, the results of this logic become evident in strategic 
choices to de-recognize collective bargaining arrangements in the interests of 
shareholder value and improved cash flow. Two, the high returns achieved by 
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private equity investments in the UK over the recent past threaten to establish 
‘lower road’ compliance approaches to industrial relations that are sometimes 
associated with the PEBM as a model for lawful contractual agreements. Third, 
less immediately direct but potentially of long lasting significance, the PEBM 
and its associated business and industrial relations strategies may become a new 
‘best practice’ template for non-private equity firms in a quest for sustained 
competitive performance (possibly to deter predatory acquisition by private 
equity).
Is private equity a significant actor or an over-hyped hot topic for academic 
research in industrial relations? It is the case that only one of the FTSE top 100 
firms is controlled by private equity. It is also the case, however, that at least 
10 percent of private sector employment is controlled by private equity. Even 
so, the vast majority of employment is beyond the control of private equity. 
However, this may well change. It is worth remembering that just 10 years 
ago private equity ownership was in large measure confined to venture capital-
ists and hedge fund investors. As trade union campaigns have made clear, the 
impact of private equity goes beyond the immediate question of ownership, 
agency and corporate governance. The effect on substantive and procedural 
aspects of industrial relations is only one feature in a movement towards a 
model of corporate control based explicitly on investor and shareholder value.
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2 None of these points are defamatory and have never been disputed by private equity 
owners, and have been repeated on many occasions in print and broadcast interviews. 
At the Treasury Select Committee Hearings in June 2007 Damon Buffini of Permira 
appeared unconcerned by this type of criticism, arguing that private equity owners 
created employment and provided secure retirement funds for pension funds and trade 
unions that invested with them.
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